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I. INTRODUCTION 
Discretionary appeals currently play a limited role in federal 
appellate jurisdiction. But reformers have long argued for a larger role.1 
And any wholesale reform of the current appellate-jurisdiction system 
will likely involve additional or expanded opportunities for discretionary 
appeals.2 Some of these will be in the form of subject or category-specific 
discretion, like the current Civil Rule 23(f) (which permits discretionary 
appeals from class certification decisions). But the more general avenues 
* Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. Thanks to Cassandra Burke Robertson, Michael
Solimine, and Joan Steinman for comments on an earlier draft. And special thanks, as always, to 
Nicole Porter. 
1. See generally Edward H. Cooper, Timing as Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in Context, 
47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (1984); Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary 
Appellate Review of Non-Final Orders: It’s Time to Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
285 (1999); Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem, 
Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717 (1993); Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory 
Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165 (1990) [hereinafter Solimine, 
Revitalizing]. 
2. See Bryan Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie: The Exaggerated Death of the Balancing
Approach and the Inescapable Allure of Flexibility in Appellate Jurisdiction, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 371, 
415 (2017) [hereinafter Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie]. 
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for discretionary appeals—which currently exist primarily in 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)—might also expand. 
In this essay, I offer some ideas for the future of discretionary 
appeals—what form they might take in a reformed system of federal 
appellate jurisdiction and how we might learn about their function. I have 
three (admittedly preliminary and undeveloped) ideas: 
• First, eliminate all limits on certified appeals under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). That provision allows a district court to
certify an interlocutory order for an immediate appeal in civil
cases, which the courts of appeals then have discretion to
review. But—due to the provision’s language and the way
courts have interpreted that language—only some district court
decisions are eligible for § 1292(b) certification. One possible
reform would be to remove any limits on the types of decisions
that could be certified under § 1292(b).
• Second, give each side in a civil action one opportunity to seek
discretionary appellate review without first obtaining district
court certification. That is, each side gets to try once.
Regardless of whether that petition to appeal is granted or
denied, no party from that side may try again without the
district court first certifying the issue for immediate appeal (or
without using another avenue for discretionary appeals, like
Rule 23(f)).
• Third, experiment with these or other possible reforms in a
limited number of circuits to see how they work. One of the
main issues with expanding discretionary appeals is
uncertainty about how they will function. How often will
parties seek discretionary review? Can courts of appeals
manage the increased caseload? Or will any increase in
interlocutory discretionary appeals be offset by a reduction in
appeals after a final judgment? We won’t know the answer to
these and other questions without first trying these new rules.
And rather than try nationwide, we might run pilot programs in
smaller circuits (such as the First Circuit) to gain some useful
data.
A wholesale switch to discretionary interlocutory appeals (for which 
some have argued) seems unlikely to me.3 But less-radical reforms seem 
plausible.4 We should accordingly start thinking about what discretionary 
3. See Bryan Lammon, Perlman Appeals After Mohawk, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2016). 
4. See Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 2, at 415. 
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appeals might look like in the future and how we might move towards that 
future. 
II. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE ROLE OF DISCRETIONARY APPEALS
As a general rule, appeals in federal court must wait until the end of 
district court proceedings, when all issues have been decided and all that 
remains is enforcing the judgment.5 But lots of exceptions to that general 
rule exist. Some are found in statutes.6 Others come from rules of 
procedure.7 And still others—indeed, lots of others—come from judicial 
decisions.8 
Discretionary appeals currently play a limited role in this system. 
Most federal appeals are as of right.9 That is, the appellants do not need 
the appellate court’s permission to take an appeal. Some appeals as of 
right come before the end of district court proceedings via one of the 
exceptions to the final-judgment rule. But most appeals as of right come 
at the end of district court proceedings. 
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018) (“The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the 
district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, 
the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review 
may be had in the Supreme Court.”); Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (defining a 
“final decision” as one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do 
but execute the judgment”); United States v. Williams, 796 F.3d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding 
that a judgment was appealable if it “end[ed] the litigation and [left] nothing but execution of the 
court’s decision, the standard definition of ‘final’ under § 1291.”). 
6. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)–(2) (2018) (granting jurisdiction to review decisions refusing 
to order arbitration); 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2018) (granting jurisdiction to review government appeals 
from orders suppressing or excluding evidence in a criminal proceeding); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) 
(2018) (granting jurisdiction over appeals from “[i]nterlocutory orders . . . granting, continuing, 
modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.”); id. 
§ 1453(c) (giving the courts of appeals discretion to review orders remanding a case that was removed
under the Class Action Fairness Act). 
7. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (giving the courts of appeals discretion to review orders granting 
or denying class certification); FED R. CIV. P. 54(b) (authorizing a district court to enter a final 
judgment for some (but not all) of the claims or parties in a case “if the court expressly determines 
that there is no just reason for delay,” thereby allowing an immediate appeal from orders that would 
otherwise have to wait for a final judgment). 
8. For overviews of the judge-made exceptions to the final-judgment rule, see generally, e.g., 
THOMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 42–49 (2d 
ed. 2009); Martineau, supra note 1, at 737–46; Aaron R. Petty, The Hidden Harmony of Appellate 
Jurisdiction, 62 S.C. L. REV. 353, 360–86 (2010). 
9. See Bryan Lammon, Finality, Appealability, the Scope of Interlocutory Review, 93 WASH.
L. REV. 1809, 1811 (2018) (noting that most of the law of federal appellate jurisdiction is built atop 
§ 1291) [hereinafter Lammon, Finality]. 
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Discretionary appeals come before the end of district court 
proceedings and are thus interlocutory.10 And unlike an appeal as of right, 
a discretionary appeal requires that the would-be appellant get permission 
to appeal. That permission might come from the district court, the court 
of appeals, or both. And the court has some amount of discretion as to 
whether to grant that permission. 
Discretionary appeals come primarily via 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 
which creates a system of dual certification for appeals in civil actions. 
When the district court determines “that [an otherwise non-appealable] 
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the 
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,” 
it can certify that order for an immediate appeal.11 The would-be appellant 
can then petition the court of appeals for permission to appeal. That court 
in turn has more-or-less complete discretion over whether to then hear the 
appeal. If the appellate court grants the petition, the case then proceeds 
like any other appeal. 
A few other avenues for discretionary appellate review exist. 
Mandamus is probably the most well-known. Though not technically an 
appeal, mandamus allows the courts of appeals to review district court 
decisions in extraordinary circumstances.12 The remaining avenues apply 
only to certain kinds of decisions or in certain proceedings. For example, 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) gives the courts of appeals 
discretion to hear appeals from class-certification decisions. A provision 
in the Class Action Fairness Act—28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)—gives the courts 
of appeals discretion to review remand orders made under that Act. And 
in a provision similar to § 1292(b), bankruptcy courts can certify an order 
for immediate appeal that the courts of appeals then have discretion to 
hear.13 
10. Perhaps the only discretionary appeals that come after the end of district court proceedings 
are discretionary appeals of remand orders under the Class Action Fairness Act. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (2018). Thanks to Michael Solimine for pointing this out. 
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018). 
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2018). For overviews of appellate mandamus, see Paul R.
Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343, 351–61 (2012); Adam N. 
Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1257–66 (2007). 
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) (2018). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(1) (2018) (governing
certified appeals from the Court of International Trade); id § 1292(d)(2) (governing certified appeals 
from the Court of Federal Claims); 48 U.S.C. § 2166(e)(3) (2018) (governing certified appeals in suits 
related to the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Security Act). 
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By nearly all accounts, the current system of federal appellate 
jurisdiction is broken and sorely in need of fixing.14 The system’s 
problems have been extensively covered elsewhere, and I don’t need to 
repeat them here.15 Suffice it to say that the current regime of federal 
appeals is complicated and unpredictable, and it doesn’t meet the needs of 
modern litigation.16 
Reform has accordingly long been a focus of the appellate-
jurisdiction literature. When it comes to discretionary appeals, proposed 
reforms have taken a few different forms. Some propose discretionary 
appellate jurisdiction over particular kinds of district court decisions or in 
particular contexts.17 Others argue for expanding or reinvigorating 
existing avenues for discretionary appeals.18 And still others argue for a 
wholesale switch to discretionary interlocutory appeals.19 
I have focused largely on wholesale reform in my work, proposing a 
system that combines discretion and categorical rules for appealability.20 
14. Lammon, Finality, supra note 9, at 1821–22; Martineau, supra note 1, at 729 (“[T]he 
unanimous view of commentators is that the rule has either too many or too few exceptions, but in 
any event requires revision.”). 
15. See, e.g., Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate
Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 423, 432–36 (2013) [hereinafter Lammon, Rules]; Steinman, supra 
note 12, at 1252–57, 1266–72. 
16. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, 47 L & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 165–66 (1984) (noting “the unconscionable intricacy of the existing law, 
depending as it does on overlapping exceptions, each less lucid than the next.”); Cooper, supra note 
1, at 157 (“The final judgment requirement has been supplemented by a list of elaborations, 
expansions, evasions, and outright exceptions that is dazzling in its complexity.”); Eisenberg & 
Morrison, supra note 1, at 291 (calling the current system “arcane and confusing”); Lammon, Finality, 
supra note 9, at 1815–25; Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the Federal Finality-Appealability Problem, 
47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 172 (1984) (“The existing federal finality-appealability situation is 
an unacceptable morass.”); Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure: 
Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Torts Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527, 556 (2002) (noting the 
“dizzying array of statutory and judicially-created [finality] exceptions”). 
17. See, e.g., Bryan Lammon, Assumed Facts and Blatant Contradictions in Qualified-
Immunity Appeals, 55 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (draft at 68–69) (suggesting discretionary 
appeals for denials of qualified immunity); Andrew S. Pollis, Civil Rule 54(b): Seventy-Five and 
Ready for Retirement, 65 FLA. L. REV. 711, 757–60 (2013) (arguing for discretionary appeals over 
decisions that resolve some (but not all) claims in a multi-claim or multi-party action) [hereinafter 
Pollis, Rule 54(b)]; Michael E. Solimine, Are Interlocutory Qualified Immunity Appeals Lawful?, 94 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 169, 183 (2019) (suggesting discretionary appeals for denials of 
qualified immunity). 
18. See generally, e.g., Solimine, Revitalizing, supra note 1, at 1201–05; Steinman, supra note 
12, at 1276–82. 
19. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 163–64; Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 1, at 293–302; 
Martineau, supra note 1, at 748–87; John C. Nagel, Note, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory 
Appeals with Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 214–22. See also Martin H. Redish, The 
Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89, 124–27 (1975). 
20. See Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 2, at 415–16. 
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Categorical rules would describe what is (and perhaps what isn’t) 
appealable before the end of district court proceedings.21 Some of those 
categorical rules might be discretionary appeals. And all of those rules 
would be capped with a discretionary catchall that would cover appeals 
that did not fall into any categorical rule.22 I have argued that this system 
(inspired by the hearsay rules in the Federal Rules of Evidence) could 
clear up the existing system of federal appellate jurisdiction and make the 
system transparent and accessible.23 And the discretionary catchall would 
inject overt flexibility into the system—something that the complexity of 
modern federal litigation requires.24 
III. TWO ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF DISCRETIONARY APPEALS
What would the discretionary catchall look like? It could be a blanket 
grant of discretion, much like the system proposed by advocates of a 
wholesale switch to discretionary interlocutory appeals. Or it could simply 
be something similar to what already exists: § 1292(b) and mandamus. 
Or it could be something else. And it’s worth thinking about what 
that something else might look like. I offer two ideas, both of them 
admittedly preliminary and undeveloped. The first is the more modest 
one: remove most (or even all) of the limits that currently exist (or seem 
to exist) on the use of § 1292(b). The second is more radical: give parties 
one opportunity in every action to seek discretionary appellate review 
from any district court decision. I’m not saying that we should adopt these 
particular rules. I am, however, saying that we need to start thinking about 
rules like them. This is accordingly only the start of the discussion. 
A. The Limitless § 1292(b) 
Let’s start with § 1292(b). Again, § 1292(b) applies only in civil 
cases. And it authorizes the district court to certify a decision for an 
immediate appeal. Specifically, it says that district courts “shall” certify 
their orders for an immediate appeal when they are “of the opinion that 
such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is 
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal 
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 416–17. 
24. Id. at 417; see also Bryan Lammon, Hall v. Hall: A Lose-Lose Case for Appellate
Jurisdiction, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1001, 1011 (2018) [hereinafter Lammon, A Lose-Lose Case]. 
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litigation.”25 When a district court certifies its decision under this statute, 
the would-be appellant then has 10 days to petition the court of appeals 
for permission to appeal.26 
Section 1292(b) could be an excellent appellate rule. In theory, it 
provides a valuable source of flexibility, allowing immediate appeals 
when the district and appellate courts agree that an appeal is warranted.27 
The district court’s gatekeeper role—requiring that it first certify an 
appeal—limits the provision’s impact on appellate work; there can be only 
as many appeals as there are certified decisions. And § 1292(b) avoids 
wasteful procedural litigation on jurisdiction. Unlike clunkier avenues for 
appeal like the collateral-order doctrine, the court of appeals decides 
whether to hear an appeal before any time is spent addressing the issues 
that the appeal raises. Michael Solimine, as well as the authors of Federal 
Practice and Procedure, have accordingly called for a broad reading and 
use of § 1292(b).28 
1. The Problem
At least that’s the theory. In practice, § 1292(b) has proved 
unsatisfactory.29 It is severely underused; district courts are too reluctant 
to certify their decisions, and even when they do, courts of appeals are too 
stingy with their own discretion.30 The reasons for this are unclear. It 
might be that courts simply disagree with their critics on the 
appropriateness of appeals. But there are at least some signs that § 1292(b) 
isn’t working as intended. For example, a recent spate of appellate 
decisions has used mandamus to reverse—actually or effectively—a 
district court’s refusal to certify an order for appeal.31 
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018). 
26. Id. 
27. 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD C. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3930 (3d ed. 1998) (“Ideally, § 1292(b) could be used to allow 
interlocutory appeals whenever the district court and court of appeals agree that immediate review is 
a good gamble.”). 
28. See id.; Solimine, Revitalizing, supra note 1, at 1204–05. 
29. See Solimine, Revitalizing, supra note 1, at 1165. 
30. See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 3929 (“[I]t is clear that § 1292(b) has not made
serious inroads on the final-judgment rule.”); Solimine, Revitalizing, supra note 1, at 1165. 
31. See In re Gee, 941 F.3d 153, 172–73 (5th Cir. 2019) (denying mandamus to decide the
plaintiff’s standing to sue but suggesting that the district court certify the merits of the plaintiff’s claim 
for a § 1292(b) appeal); In re Trump, 781 F. App’x 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (denying mandamus to 
reverse the denial of a § 1292(b) certification but also remanding the matter for “immediate 
reconsideration”); In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 372 (4th Cir. 2019) (directing a district court—via a 
writ of mandamus—to certify an issue for immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)), rehearing 
en banc granted, 780 F. App’x 36 (4th Cir. 2019). See also Michael E. Solimine, The Renaissance of 
7
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So what’s wrong with § 1292(b)? Commentators have ventured a 
few guesses. First and primarily are the ways in which courts have treated 
the criteria specified in § 1292(b): a substantial ground for difference of 
opinion, a controlling question of law, and material advancement of the 
litigation. These criteria might be read as guidelines for the district court 
to consider when deciding whether to certify an order. But courts 
sometimes speak of these criteria as prerequisites to or requirements for a 
§ 1292(b) certification.32 That is, the district court cannot certify an order
unless all three of these criteria are satisfied. Several courts have added an 
extra-textual “big case” requirement to § 1292(b), holding that certified 
appeals are appropriate only in “big” or “exceptional” cases.33 
This practice—reading § 1292(b)’s criteria as prerequisites to 
certification—poses several problems. For one thing, it unwisely restricts 
the category of orders to which § 1292(b) could apply.34 The three 
statutory criteria, and even the extra-textual “big case” requirement, are 
all relevant to determining whether an interlocutory appeal is appropriate. 
But they’re underinclusive. Lots of district court decisions that fail to meet 
one or more of those criteria might merit an immediate appeal. When 
applied strictly and cumulatively, these criteria impede the use of 
§ 1292(b).35 When an order doesn’t seem to satisfy one or more of the
criteria, courts must either deny the certification or fudge the criteria. 
For another thing, as far as requirements go, § 1292(b)’s are fuzzy 
and vague. That’s not a good look for an appellate rule. To see why, it’s 
worth considering the components of appellate rules. All appellate rules 
Permissive Interlocutory Appeals and the Demise of the Collateral Order Doctrine, 53 AKRON L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2020) (draft at 7–13). 
32. 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 3930 (“Opinions that elaborate on the reasons for
permitting or refusing to permit appeal, however, tend to reflect a less relaxed attitude that may 
interfere with full realization of the statutory purposes. No insuperable barriers have been raised, but 
there is a risk that flexible application may be discouraged by opinions that imply restrictive views of 
the statutory criteria in expressing the conclusion that interlocutory appeal is not desirable in a 
particular case.”). 
33. See id.; Solimine, Revitalizing, supra note 1, at 1173, 1193–95. 
34. 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 3929 (“The flexible approach to § 1292(b) is far
superior to blind adherence to a supposed need to construe strictly any permission to depart from the 
final-judgment rule.”); Solimine, Revitalizing, supra note 1, at 1193 (“The limitation of the statute to 
‘big cases,’ and the narrow definitions of the three criteria by which district judges must review 
certification motions, have limited use of the statute, at least in some quarters.”). 
35. 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 3929 (“So long as the district court has made an order, 
the three factors that justify interlocutory appeal should be treated as guiding criteria rather than 
jurisdictional requisites . . . . The three factors should be viewed together as the statutory language 
equivalent of a direction to consider the probable gains and losses of immediate appeal.”). 
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have two components: the conditions under which an appeal is allowed, 
and the category of orders to which the rule applies.36 
The conditions under which an appeal are allowed implicate the 
familiar rules-versus-standards debate.37 The conditions of appeal fall 
somewhere on a spectrum between a hard-and-fast rule and a flexible, 
case-by-case standard.38 Rule-like requirements for an appeal can be seen 
in the final-judgment rule itself: an appeal is proper when the district court 
has decided all outstanding issues (though there is still some nuance to 
that rule, along with a few exceptions).39 Standard-like conditions would 
be the exercise of discretion over the propriety of an appeal, like Rule 
23(f).40 
Separate from the conditions for an appeal is the category of orders 
to which an appellate rule applies; that is, the orders that are eligible to be 
considered under the relevant conditions for appeal.41 Categories have at 
least two dimensions. First, they fall somewhere on a spectrum between 
narrow and broad categories. Narrow categories encompass only specific 
kinds of orders or circumstances; again, Rule 23(f) (which applies to 
class-certification decisions) provides a nice example. Broader categories 
apply to all orders in a particular kind of case (e.g., multidistrict litigation, 
civil cases) or even all district court decisions (e.g., mandamus). 
Categories also fall somewhere on a spectrum, this one between clear 
categories and fuzzy ones.42 A clear category leaves little ambiguity over 
whether a particular district court order is eligible for the appellate rule. 
The law being the law, some ambiguity is inevitable at the margins.43 But 
for the most part, there is little dispute over whether an order fits within—
and can be evaluated under—a particular appellate rule. A fuzzy category 
36. See Richard L. Heppner Jr., Conceptualizing Appealability: Resisting the Supreme Court’s 
Categorical Imperative, 55 TULSA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (draft at 27–29). 
37. See id. at 23–25; Lammon, Rules, supra note 15, at 448–52. 
38. See Heppner, supra note 36, at 23–25.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018). 
40. This does not mean that Rule 23(f) has “standards” for when appeals are proper; it doesn’t, 
and the courts of appeals have had to develop criteria for evaluating the propriety of a Rule 23(f) 
appeal. I simply mean that the conditions under which an appeal is proper are not defined by hard-
and-fast rules but instead by considerations that guide the court in its decisionmaking. 
41. See Heppner, supra note 36, at 27. 
42. See id. at 50–51. 
43. See, e.g., Matz v. Household Int’l Tax Reduction Investment Plan, 687 F.3d 824, 826 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (addressing whether an order modifying the scope of a previously certified class is 
appealable under Rule 23(f)); Fleischman v. Albany Med. Ctr., 639 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam) (addressing whether an order denying a motion to amend a class-certification order revives 
the time for taking a Rule 23(f) appeal). 
9
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is the opposite, creating uncertainty about whether an appellate rule 
applies to a particular district court order. 
I think that clear categories are appropriate for most (if not all) 
appellate rules. Clear categories minimize uncertainty and—
importantly—litigation over whether an appellate rule applies to a 
particular district court order. They focus attention instead on the 
conditions for appeal. That determination can be easy with rule-like 
conditions for appeal. Or it can require the exercise of judgment and 
discretion with standard-like conditions for appeal. In either case, 
attention is focused on whether an appeal is appropriate. 
Back to § 1292(b). The appellate court’s role can be easily described: 
once the district court has certified a decision, the court of appeals 
exercises complete discretion over whether an appeal is appropriate. So 
the conditions for appeal are just about as standard-like as they get. And 
the category of orders eligible for the appellate court’s discretion is 
narrow and clear: any order the district court has certified under 
§ 1292(b).
At the district court level, § 1292(b) seems to couple a fuzzy category 
with a standard-like exercise of discretion. Reading § 1292(b)’s criteria as 
requirements—i.e., the district court cannot certify an order unless those 
requirements are met—creates uncertainty and litigation over whether an 
order is eligible for certification. It’s not clear from the get-go whether 
these criteria are satisfied. Opinions can differ on whether a question is 
controlling or whether a substantial ground for disagreement exists or 
whether an appeal would advance the litigation or even whether a question 
is one of law.44 This means uncertainty and litigation over eligibility, 
which can distract from the more important issue of whether the order in 
question should be immediately appealed. 
The situation is even worse when you couple this vague category 
with an arguably discretionary determination. It’s not clear whether 
district courts are supposed to make a discretionary (as opposed to 
mandatory) decision on certification.45 But if their decision is 
44. See generally 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 3930; Solimine, Revitalizing, supra note 
1, at 1172–74. 
45. The legislative history says that the district court’s decision is discretionary. See 16 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 3929 (“[T]he appeal is discretionary rather than a matter of right. It 
is discretionary in the first instance with the district judge . . . .”). See also id. (“The initial 
determination that appeal is desirable is confided to the discretion of the district judge, relying on the 
criteria specified in the statute.”); BAKER, supra note 8, at 59. But the statute’s use of the term “shall” 
has led some to argue that the district court has only limited discretion in certifying an order under 
§ 1292(b). See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: 
A Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733, 779–81 (2006). 
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discretionary, all the worse. There is little use in coupling uncertainty over 
eligibility with uncertainty over appealability. That simply invites two 
disputes instead of one. And given the vagueness of the eligibility 
determination, the two will almost inevitably overlap. A lot of time and 
effort could be saved by instead focusing directly on the latter question of 
whether the order should be appealed. 
In practice, it might be the case that district courts are marking 
flexible, pragmatic decisions about the appropriateness of an appeal under 
the auspices of § 1292(b)’s criteria. That is, even if they speak in terms of 
requirements, district courts might actually be exercising the discretion 
that I think is appropriate in this circumstance. But then we have covert 
flexibility. This is good insofar as it allows for discretion. But I’m no fan 
of covert flexibility; flexibility should be overt so that the parties know 
what to argue about and the district court can candidly explain the basis 
for its decision.46 
Or it might be the case that courts are not, in practice, applying 
§ 1292(b) flexibly. That means rigid, formalistic decisionmaking that is
anathema to our current regime of federal appellate jurisdiction. And 
that’s even worse. Flexibility is necessary for a working system of 
appeals, and § 1292(b) is currently the best (and perhaps the only 
appropriate) outlet for that flexibility.47 
2. No Limits
We cannot know for certain how much the textual (and non-textual) 
limits and uncertainties in § 1292(b) are impeding its use. But these limits 
and uncertainties don’t serve much of a purpose. The rule accordingly 
might improve were we to remove them as strict preconditions to an 
appeal. That is, a limitless § 1292(b) might finally accomplish the sound 
use of discretionary appeals that both Michael Solimine and Wright, 
Miller & Cooper have separately advocated. This does not mean that 
courts would be completely at sea when deciding the propriety of an 
appeal; the statute could include guidance, or the courts could develop 
their own. But the analysis would no longer rigidly require satisfying 
certain underinclusive, cumulative requirements. 
What would this rule look like? Section 1292(b) currently reads: 
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise 
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order 
46. See Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 2, at 417. 
47. See Lammon, A Lose-Lose Case, supra note 24, at 1011. 
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involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the 
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, 
he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which 
would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in 
its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if 
application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: 
Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not 
stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court 
of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.48 
A reformed—and limitless—§ 1292(b) might say: 
In a civil action, a district court may certify an order for an immediate 
appeal. The court of appeals that would have jurisdiction over an appeal 
in that action may then permit an appeal to be taken from that order. 
Application to the court of appeals must be made within 10 days. And 
application for an appeal under this section does not stay district court 
proceedings unless the district court or the court of appeals so orders. 
Let’s break this down a bit. First, the limit to civil cases is retained 
(I’ll return to this in a moment). Second, by saying “a district court may 
certify,” the revised rule removes any doubt that the district court has 
discretion to certify; no more “shalls.” Third, there is no suggestion of any 
prerequisites to the district court’s certification; the court can exercise its 
judgment to determine whether it thinks a decision warrants an immediate 
appeal. The rest is more or less the same; the court of appeals has 
discretion to accept the appeal, the petition must be filed within 10 days, 
and district court proceedings are not stayed without an appropriate order. 
These revisions focus both the district court and the court of appeals 
on the central question: would this decision benefit from immediate 
appellate review? Courts would likely develop standards governing both 
exercises of discretion. But those standards would be just that—standards, 
which would guide the parties in making their arguments and the courts 
in making their decisions. And perhaps most importantly, courts would 
make those decisions in procedurally appropriate circumstances—directly 
tackling the appropriateness of an appeal before any time is wasted on the 
merits of that appeal (unlike they currently do in, for example, the 
collateral-order doctrine context). 
A revised § 1292(b) could also eliminate the need for Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 54(b). Rule 54(b) allows the district court to certify for 
an immediate appeal an order that resolves some (but not all) of the claims 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018). 
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in a multi-party or multi-claim suit. If the district court so certifies—
finding that there is “no just reason for delay”—the parties then have a 
right to appeal. While Rule 54(b) might at first seem useful and even 
pragmatic, Andrew Pollis has revealed its problems.49 Rule 54(b)’s terms 
create uncertainty and disputes over whether a decision is eligible for a 
certification. And the rule gives the district court power to control 
appellate jurisdiction, occasionally creating a power struggle between the 
district and appellate courts. Pollis accordingly suggested reforming 
§ 1292(b) to add a provision for double-certified discretionary appeals
from orders that resolve a party’s entitlement to relief on a particular legal 
theory.50 A limitless § 1292(b) would make Pollis’s suggested change 
unnecessary, as it could handle the orders that Rule 54(b) normally would. 
And like Pollis’s suggestion, a limitless § 1292(b) would appropriately 
direct those matters to the discretion of both the district court and appellate 
court. 
One last note. Section 1292(b) currently applies only in civil cases. 
Arguments have been made to expand it to criminal cases.51 As of now, I 
have no opinion on whether doing so is wise; it’s an issue to which I have 
not given enough thought. I will note that pushes for increased appeals are 
less common (though hardly nonexistent) in the criminal context. And 
courts regularly emphasize the need to limit interlocutory appeals in 
criminal proceedings.52 But I leave this issue for another day. 
B. The One-Opportunity Appeal 
Even this revised § 1292(b) still requires double certification. What 
about appeals solely at the discretion of the courts of appeals? Again, a 
move to this has long been advocated, fueled in part by dissatisfaction 
with the district court’s gatekeeper role under § 1292(b). And absolute 
discretion has some benefits. It would place a check on district courts 
trying to force a settlement with decisions that are insulated from appeals. 
And there are likely occasions in which appellate courts think an 
49. See generally Pollis, Rule 54(b), supra note 17. 
50. Id. at 760. 
51. See generally Daniel J. Adelman, Comment, Time Is of the Essence: The Case for
Amending 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to Permit Interlocutory Appeals in Criminal Cases, 1986 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 727 (1986); Raymond A. Hayward, Note, Amending 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to Permit 
Interlocutory Appeals in Federal Criminal Proceedings—An Economic Analysis, 67 IOWA L. 
REV. 1037 (1982). 
52. See, e.g., United States v. Sueiro, 946 F.3d 637, 640 (4th Cir. 2020). 
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immediate appeal is warranted regardless of what the district court 
thinks.53 
But one persistent concern with a wholesale switch to discretion is 
impact on appellate caseloads.54 Reform efforts are sensitive to increasing 
appellate caseloads.55 And it’s at least plausible that a wholesale switch to 
discretion would increase appellate workloads. Even if appellate courts 
were chary of granting permission to appeal—and thus actual appeals did 
not increase beyond the courts’ capabilities—the courts of appeals would 
still have to deal with an increased number of petitions to appeal.56 
Petitions to appeal are almost certainly less work than full-blown appeals. 
But they’re not nothing. And allowing litigants to seek discretionary 
appeals from any district court decision creates at least a realistic chance 
that the courts of appeals will be inundated with petitions to appeal. This 
increased workload might be temporary—litigants might adjust to the new 
reality. Multiple appeals in a single case, however, could very well 
become common. 
Balancing the costs and benefits of discretionary appeals thus likely 
requires limiting their number. Section 1292(b) did that by requiring that 
litigants first obtain permission from the district court.57 Other forms of 
discretionary appeals (such as Rule 23(f) and § 1453(c)) limit the number 
of petitions to appeal by limiting those petitions to a specific kind of order; 
there can only be as many petitions to appeal as there are orders of that 
type. But there might be other ways. 
One possibility comes from Kenneth Kilbert’s recent proposal for 
“challenge appeals.” Inspired by instant-replay review in sports, Kilbert 
offered a rule whereby “plaintiff and defendant each has the right to 
appeal one interlocutory order in the case immediately to the court of 
appeals, without the need for any permission by a judge.”58 As Kilbert 
saw it, challenge appeals would open interlocutory appeals to a wide 
variety of orders, provide certainty over appealability, reduce procedural 
53. See the mandamus/§ 1292(b) cases cited supra note 31. 
54. See Lammon, Rules, supra note 15, at 433–34; Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and
Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 236–40 
(2001). 
55. See Lammon, Rules, supra note 15, at 433–34. 
56. See Bryan Lammon, Appellate Jurisdiction in Sanchez-Gomez: A Hard Case that Should
Be Easy, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 7 (2018). 
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018). 
58. Kenneth K. Kilbert, Instant Replay and Interlocutory Appeals, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 
269 (2017). 
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litigation over what can be appealed, and keep the number of interlocutory 
appeals manageable.59 
Kilbert’s proposal is fascinating. But I’m concerned about its impact 
on appellate workloads. The rule would allow for two interlocutory 
appeals as of right in every case. If those challenge appeals are coupled 
with an appeal from a final judgment, we then have three full trips to the 
court of appeals in a single case. To be sure, we don’t know how 
frequently that would occur. But it’s a risk. 
I offer a variation on Kilbert’s idea. Rather than give both sides the 
right to one appeal, give them each one opportunity to seek a discretionary 
appeal. That is, each side could would have one chance to ask the court of 
appeals for permission to appeal any district court decision. They would 
have a short window in which to petition—say, 14 days from the order. 
And at some point before trial, they would lose this opportunity had they 
not used it—say, after the final pretrial order or when jury selection 
begins. Regardless of whether a side’s petition to appeal is granted or 
denied, that side cannot ask again. Or, at least, they couldn’t ask again 
under this rule; other discretionary options like § 1292(b) and Rule 23(f) 
would still exist. 
Rather than risk two interlocutory appeals as of right, giving each 
side only the opportunity to seek appellate review would mean a 
maximum of two petitions for interlocutory appeal. A cap thus exists on 
the number of requests for discretionary review. Granted, the number is 
somewhat arbitrary. There could be cases in which several interlocutory 
appeals were warranted (but that a district court, for whatever reason, 
would refuse to certify under § 1292(b)). And there certainly will be cases 
in which no interlocutory appeals are needed. The rule would thus be both 
under- and overinclusive. But at least there’s a cap. 
Further, the use-it-and-lose-it nature of the appeal might make some 
litigants never use it. Some litigants might want to save their chance at an 
interlocutory appeal in case a particularly important district court decision 
doesn’t go their way. Those litigants might pass on several orders from 
which they could have sought review. And the important order that they 
were waiting for might never come; once the final pretrial order is issued 
(or jury selection begins, or whatever), they can no longer seek permission 
to appeal. The rule thus mixes incentives and uncertainty to further 
discourage the use of this procedure. 
Limits would need to exist when one side comprises multiple parties. 
And I think Kilbert handled this issue well in his recommendation for 
59. Id. at 299–302. 
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challenge appeals.60 One option would be to give each individual party its 
own one-opportunity appeal. But that would be too much. Keeping the 
number of petitions to appeal low is a key feature of this proposal. Giving 
each individual party a shot at an interlocutory appeal could mean dozens 
of attempts in larger suits. 
The better option is to give each side one opportunity to seek 
discretionary review. This makes especially good sense for plaintiffs, who 
generally are the masters of their claims and choose who’s on their side.61 
It’s different for defendants, who have little say in who their co-parties 
are and might even be adverse to them. But they, too, should ultimately 
be limited to one appeal. Defendants often have much in common and 
sometimes even work jointly.62 They do not have to become adverse in 
litigation, since cross-claims are permissive.63 And allowing one side 
multiple attempts at appeal loses one of the key limits for one-opportunity 
appeals: the limit on the number of petitions that could be filed in a single 
case. So in cases of multiple defendants, as with multiple plaintiffs, the 
first mover gets the chance at an appeal.64 That being said, nothing is 
stopping the parties on one side from agreeing among themselves that they 
unanimously agree about the propriety of taking their side’s appeal.65 
Another option for dealing with multiple parties is to make them 
share the one opportunity to seek a discretionary appeal. That is, there 
would be only one opportunity per case for anybody to seek appellate 
review. Whichever party took the opportunity first would get it. That 
would mean only one potential petition to appeal in each action, further 
reducing appellate workloads. How parties would use these appeals is not 
entirely clear. Parties might swiftly take their first opportunity to appeal 
to deprive their opponent of that chance. Or the rule might result in a 
standoff—each waiting nervously for an order they want to appeal—with 
neither party taking an appeal until a crucial decision. 
One final variation on these kinds of appeals—particularly if they’re 
limited to only one appeal in each action rather than one per side—is to 
require that parties agree to the use of the procedure. That is, neither party 
would be able to unilaterally seek a discretionary appeal. The parties 
would instead have to agree on what to try and appeal. This is similar to a 
60. See id. at 309–12. 
61. Id. at 309. 
62. Id. at 310. 
63. Id. at 310. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g).
64. Kilbert, supra note 58, at 311. 
65. Id. at 311–12. 
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procedure proposed by James Pfander and David Krohn.66 They 
suggested that parties be should be allowed to agree to ask the district 
court to certify an issue for immediate appeal.67 This final variation on the 
one-opportunity appeal would similarly operate by the agreement of the 
parties, though they would go straight to the court of appeals with their 
request. 
There is also (and again) the question of whether this rule would 
apply in criminal cases. Again, and for much the same reasons as a 
limitless § 1292(b), I have no position on that matter at this time. 
IV. CIRCUIT EXPERIMENTATION
Just proposing new discretionary-appeal rules won’t be enough. 
Debate persists over how any appellate-jurisdiction reform—
discretionary or otherwise—would work in practice.68 And that debate 
sometimes seems interminable and irreconcilable.69 
Part of the difficulty stems from defining “work”; that’s a value-
laden judgment, and reasonable minds can disagree over the merits of 
particular appellate rules. But another problem comes from a lack of 
information on which those judgments should be based. The 
consequences of most proposed appellate reforms are uncertain.70 We can 
predict a rule’s effects—such as the frequency with which district court 
proceedings would be interrupted and appellate workloads would be 
increased—based on reasonable assumptions about litigant and court 
behavior.71 And we can even be fairly confident in some of those 
predictions. But those predictions might very well be wrong. We can 
sometimes look to similar state practices for data. But efforts to look to 
the states have been criticized, as unique aspects of federal litigation 
(greater complexity, well-resourced parties) can render state experience 
unhelpful.72 In short, we don’t really know what any discretionary system 
would look like in practice. And uncertainty over the consequences of any 
particular appellate reform can stand in the way of adopting that reform. 
66. See generally James E. Pfander & David R. Pekarek Krohn, Interlocutory Review by
Agreement of the Parties: A Preliminary Analysis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1043 (2011). 
67. See id. at 1053. 
68. See Lammon, Rules, supra note 15, at 432–36. 
69. See id. 
70. See id. at 434. 
71. See id. at 436. 
72. Compare Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 1, at 297–301 (relying on Wisconsin’s 
experience with discretionary appeals to argue for a move to discretionary appeals in the federal 
system), and Martineau, supra note 1, at 777–87 (same), with Glynn, supra note 54, at 236–37 
(doubting the relevance of the Wisconsin experience to federal appeals). 
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Some information on the consequences of particular appellate rules 
might help. And one way to learn about the consequences of an appellate 
rule is to try it. I once proposed judicial experimentation as a means for 
learning about different appellate rules.73 I suggested that courts could use 
the collateral-order doctrine to craft rules allowing particular orders to be 
appealed.74 Courts could then apply that rule for a period of years and 
learn how it operates. If need be, courts could eventually revise or 
abandon the rule. 
I now doubt the feasibility (not to mention likelihood) of this kind of 
judicial experimentation. The collateral-order doctrine is an awkward tool 
for crafting appellate rules. And courts don’t seem to have much interest 
in experimenting with these rules. 
But experimentation is still possible. Rulemakers (with a little help 
from Congress) can craft appellate rules, too.75 We could thus try 
appellate rules via rulemaking—those I’ve proposed or others, such as 
Kilbert’s or Pfander and Krohn’s—to see how they work. And doing so 
does not require adopting a rule nationwide. Congress could instead 
authorize one or more circuits to experiment with appellate rules. The 
Supreme Court (via the rulemaking process) could then create those rules, 
and the Federal Judicial Center could monitor their operation. Eventually 
rulemakers could better assess a proposed appellate rule and predict how 
it would function nationwide. 
This would likely require congressional action. Although the 
Supreme Court has the authority to create procedural rules on 
appealability, the Rules Enabling Act requires that those rules be 
“general.”76 Creating special procedural rules for one or more circuits thus 
seems problematic under the existing statutes. But Congressional action 
could fix this. Indeed, circuit experimentation is not entirely novel. In 
1998, the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts 
of Appeals (commonly called the “White Commission” after its chair, 
Justice Byron White) suggested empowering the courts of appeals to 
create intra-circuit divisions as they grow.77 The Commission suggested 
legislation that would create these divisions in the Ninth Circuit, with the 
Federal Judicial Center monitoring that circuit’s experience for eight 
73. See Lammon, Rules, supra note 15, at 445–59. 
74. See id. 
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072. 
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018). 
77. COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,
FINAL REPORT 61 (1998). 
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years.78 After the eight-year experiment, the Judicial Conference would 
have made recommendations to Congress on the further use of divisions.79 
As for where any experimentation might take place, circuits with 
lower caseloads are probably the best candidates. One major (if not the 
major) concern with increased discretionary appeals is appellate 
caseloads. It thus makes sense to experiment with new avenues for appeals 
where caseloads are already low. That way, if the experiment goes 
horribly wrong and caseloads increase substantially, the court will 
hopefully still be able to manage its business through the course of the 
experiment. 
That probably means the First, Tenth, or D.C. Circuits.80 They each 
have a relatively low absolute number of appeals and a relatively low 
number of decisions-per-judge.81 So they are probably best positioned to 
absorb any increase in appellate workloads. These lower workloads also 
suggest that the First, Tenth, or D.C. Circuits would be good barometers 
for the workability of an appellate rule; if something cannot work in the 
Tenth Circuit, it probably won’t work in the Ninth. This isn’t to say that 
success in any of these circuits means that a rule would function well 
nationwide. Circuit differences in caseloads as well as staffing, internal 
procedures, and even cultures might affect the consequences of a new 
appellate rule. But trying new appellate rules where they are most likely 
to function is at least a start. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The next several decades will hopefully see some reform of federal 
appellate jurisdiction. Granted, the literature has pushed reform for years. 
But sustained efforts—with new visions for appellate timing and 
information on how new structures might function—might make reform 
more likely. It’s accordingly worth considering what a reformed system 
of appellate jurisdiction might look like. I’ve offered three ideas for 
78. Id. at 95. 
79. Id. at 43. 
80. The Federal Court Management Statistics Summary includes the number of cases
terminated on the merits per active judge for the past 12 months. In the 12-month period ending 
September 30, 2019, the First, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits each terminated 447, 228, and 210 cases per 
judge. The Tenth and D.C. Circuit numbers are the two lowest. Four circuits have a lower number of 
merits terminations per judge than the First Circuit: the Second (389), Third (424), Sixth (292), and 
Seventh (366). But each of those four circuits has a much greater total caseload than the First does. 
See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS SUMMARY—12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2019, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_appsumary0930.2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PD6S-CJST]. 
81. See id. 
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discretionary appeals, but there are many more possibilities. And we 
should start finding ways to break the empirical impasse that hinders 
serious consideration of new appellate rules. 
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